Critical elitism deliberation, democracy, and the problem of expertise

Democracies have a problem with expertise. Expert knowledge both mediates and facilitates public apprehension of problems, yet it also threatens to exclude the public from consequential judgments and decisions located in technical domains. This book asks: how can we have inclusion without collapsing...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Moore, Alfred James
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2017
Series:Theories of institutional design
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Cambridge Books Online - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a Critical elitism  |b deliberation, democracy, and the problem of expertise  |c Alfred Moore, University of Cambridge 
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300 |a ix, 213 pages  |b digital 
505 0 |a Machine generated contents note: Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1. Two faces of epistemic democracy; 2. Democracy and problem of expertise; 3. Political and epistemic authority; 4. The problem of judgment; 5. Contestation; 6. Consensus; 7. Institutional innovations; Conclusion; References; Index 
653 |a Democracy / Philosophy 
653 |a Expertise 
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520 |a Democracies have a problem with expertise. Expert knowledge both mediates and facilitates public apprehension of problems, yet it also threatens to exclude the public from consequential judgments and decisions located in technical domains. This book asks: how can we have inclusion without collapsing the very concept of expertise? How can public judgment be engaged in expert practices in a way that does not reduce to populism? Drawing on deliberative democratic theory and social studies of science, Critical Elitism argues that expert authority depends ultimately on the exercise of public judgment in a context in which there are live possibilities for protest, opposition and scrutiny. This account points to new ways of looking at the role of civil society, expert institutions, and democratic innovations in the constitution of expert authority within democratic systems. Using the example of climate science, Critical Elitism highlights not only the risks but also the benefits of contesting expertise