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161223 ||| eng |
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|a 9781513584263
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Goodhart, C.
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| 245 |
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|a Optimal Bank Recovery
|c C. Goodhart, Miguel Segoviano
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2015
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| 300 |
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|a 41 pages
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Segoviano, Miguel
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781513584263.001
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u http://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/217/001.2015.issue-217-en.xml
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Banks' living wills involve both recovery and resolution. Since it may not always be clear when recovery plans or actions should be triggered, there is a role for an objective metric to trigger recovery. We outline how such a metric could be constructed meeting criteria of (i) adequate loss absorption; (ii) distinguishing between weak and sound banks; (iii) little susceptibility to manipulation; (iv) timeliness; (v) scalable from the individual bank to the system. We show how this would have worked in the U.K., during 2007-11. This approach has the added advantage that it could be extended to encompass a whole ladder of sanctions of increasing severity as capital erodes
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