|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
02606nmm a2200529 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB001308462 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000000893074 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
161223 ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9781513583853
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Gupta, Sanjeev
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Now or Later? The Political Economy of Public Investment in Democracies
|c Sanjeev Gupta, Estelle Liu, Carlos Mulas-Granados
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2015
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 38 pages
|
| 651 |
|
4 |
|a United States
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Other
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public investment spending
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Budget Systems
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal rules
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public finance & taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt Management
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debts, Public
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal Policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Fiscal policy
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Expenditure
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Sovereign Debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Expenditures, Public
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Current spending
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Macroeconomics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public investments
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a National Budget
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public Finance
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Liu, Estelle
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Mulas-Granados, Carlos
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
| 490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781513583853.001
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/175/001.2015.issue-175-en.xml?cid=43130-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a This paper explores the impact of political and institutional variables on public investment. Working with a sample of 80 presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1975 and 2012, we find that the rate of growth of public investment is higher at the beginning of electoral cycles and decelerates thereafter. The peak in public investment growth occurs between 21 and 25 months before elections. Cabinet ideology and government fragmentation influence the size of investment booms. More parties in government are associated with smaller increases in public investment while left-wing cabinets are associated with higher sustained increases in investment. Stronger institutions help attenuate the impact of elections on investment, but available information is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions
|