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161223 ||| eng |
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|a 9781498372671
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|a Ganelli, Giovanni
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|a Value of WTO Trade Agreements in a New Keynesian Model
|c Giovanni Ganelli, Juha Tervala
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2015
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| 300 |
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|a 35 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Wealth
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| 653 |
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|a Tariff
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| 653 |
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|a Tariffs
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| 653 |
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|a Trade agreements
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| 653 |
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|a Labour; income economics
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| 653 |
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|a International Trade Organizations
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| 653 |
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|a Commercial treaties
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Taxes
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| 653 |
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|a Saving
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| 653 |
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|a Trade Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Trade liberalization
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| 653 |
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|a Open Economy Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a Demand and Supply of Labor: General
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| 653 |
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|a National accounts
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| 653 |
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
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|a Labor supply
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| 653 |
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|a Commercial policy
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption; Economics
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| 653 |
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|a International trade
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Labor market
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Tervala, Juha
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781498372671.001
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/037/001.2015.issue-037-en.xml?cid=42733-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a We revisit the question of the quantitative benefits of WTO trade agreements in a setup that is non-standard from the traditional trade policy point of view. We show that in a New Keynesian model, unilateral trade liberalization reduces welfare due to terms-of-trade deterioration, creating an incentive for a trade agreement. For realistic parameter values, the value of an agreement, which cuts tariffs by one percentage point, is 0.5% to 2% of consumption, much larger than in trade models. The intuition for this result hinges on some New Keynesian features of our framework, such as imperfect competition and endogenous labor supply
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