|
|
|
|
LEADER |
03297nmm a2200589 u 4500 |
001 |
EB001308306 |
003 |
EBX01000000000000000892918 |
005 |
00000000000000.0 |
007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
008 |
161223 ||| eng |
020 |
|
|
|a 9781475576207
|
100 |
1 |
|
|a Jones, Bradley
|
245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Asset Bubbles
|b Re-thinking Policy for the Age of Asset Management
|c Bradley Jones
|
260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2015
|
300 |
|
|
|a 59 pages
|
651 |
|
4 |
|a United States
|
653 |
|
|
|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
|
653 |
|
|
|a Inflation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Stock exchanges
|
653 |
|
|
|a Finance
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial crises
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial sector stability
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial sector policy and analysis
|
653 |
|
|
|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Deflation
|
653 |
|
|
|a Asset bubbles
|
653 |
|
|
|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
|
653 |
|
|
|a Asset and liability management
|
653 |
|
|
|a International Financial Markets
|
653 |
|
|
|a Asset prices
|
653 |
|
|
|a Price Level
|
653 |
|
|
|a Asset management
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial markets
|
653 |
|
|
|a Stock markets
|
653 |
|
|
|a Asset-liability management
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
|
653 |
|
|
|a Prices
|
653 |
|
|
|a Macroeconomics
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial services industry
|
653 |
|
|
|a Information and Market Efficiency
|
653 |
|
|
|a Central Banks and Their Policies
|
653 |
|
|
|a Event Studies
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial Risk Management
|
653 |
|
|
|a Finance: General
|
653 |
|
|
|a Financial Crises
|
041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781475576207.001
|
856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2015/027/001.2015.issue-027-en.xml?cid=42700-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
520 |
|
|
|a In distilling a vast literature spanning the rational— irrational divide, this paper offers reflections on why asset bubbles continue to threaten economic stability despite financial markets becoming more informationally-efficient, more complete, and more heavily influenced by sophisticated (i.e. presumably rational) institutional investors. Candidate explanations for bubble persistence—such as limits to learning, frictional limits to arbitrage, and behavioral errors—seem unsatisfactory as they are inconsistent with the aforementioned trends impacting global capital markets. In lieu of the short-term nature of the asset owner—manager relationship, and the momentum bias inherent in financial benchmarks, I argue that the business risk of asset managers acts as strong motivation for institutional herding and ‘rational bubble-riding.’ Two key policy implications follow. First, procyclicality could intensify as institutional assets under management continue to grow. Second, remedial policies should extend beyond the standard suite of macroprudential and monetary measures to include time-invariant policies targeted at the cause (not just symptom) of the problem. Prominent among these should be reforms addressing principal-agent contract design and the implementation of financial benchmarks
|