The inessential indexical on the philosophical insignificance of perspective and the first person
Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways,...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2014, 2014
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| Series: | Context and content / Context and content
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 9780191766824 |