The two selves their metaphysical commitments and functional independence
Klein takes the position that the self is not a 'thing' easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists of a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construe...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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New York
Oxford University Press
2014, 2014
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| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
| Summary: | Klein takes the position that the self is not a 'thing' easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists of a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to treatment by current scientific methods |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 9780199369454 |