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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781589062160
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| 100 |
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|a Daban Sanchez, Teresa
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| 245 |
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|a Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain
|c Teresa Daban Sanchez, Steven Symansky, Gian Milesi-Ferretti, Enrica Detragiache, Gabriel Di Bella
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2003
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| 300 |
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|a 46 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Spain
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal stance
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| 653 |
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|a Public debt
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| 653 |
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|a Budget Systems
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal rules
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal policy
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| 653 |
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|a Budgeting
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| 653 |
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|a Production; Economic theory
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| 653 |
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditure
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Production
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| 653 |
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|a Budget
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditures, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Budgeting & financial management
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| 653 |
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|a National Budget
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Production and Operations Management
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Symansky, Steven
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Milesi-Ferretti, Gian
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Detragiache, Enrica
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a Occasional Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781589062160.084
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781589062160/9781589062160.xml?cid=16380-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies
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