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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451862256
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Ostry, Jonathan
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention
|c Jonathan Ostry, Jeromin Zettelmeyer
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2005
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| 300 |
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|a 23 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Argentina
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| 653 |
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|a Crisis prevention
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| 653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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| 653 |
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|a International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Currency; Foreign exchange
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| 653 |
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|a Capital markets
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| 653 |
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|a Capital market
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| 653 |
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|a Crisis management
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a International Economic Order and Integration
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign Exchange
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| 653 |
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|a Financial markets
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| 653 |
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|a Emerging and frontier financial markets
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services industry
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| 653 |
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|a Tax incentives
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rates
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Finance: General
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign exchange
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| 653 |
|
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|a Financial Crises
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Zettelmeyer, Jeromin
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451862256.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2005/206/001.2005.issue-206-en.xml?cid=18679-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a To better fulfill its crisis-prevention mandate, IMF surveillance needs to provide stronger incentives for countries to follow good policies and for markets to avoid boom-bust cycles in capital flows. To this end, surveillance should culminate in a summary public assessment of the quality of a country's policies and stipulate the actions needed to address shortcomings. A country's potential access to IMF credits should be linked to the quality of its policies in noncrisis periods in order to create stronger incentives for better policies and reduce incentives for capital to flow where it cannot be used in socially beneficial ways
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