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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451875232
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Ahmad, Ehtisham
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs
|c Ehtisham Ahmad, Leonardo Martinez
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2004
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| 300 |
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|a 14 pages
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Budget Systems
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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| 653 |
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|a State and Local Government
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| 653 |
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|a Budget planning and preparation
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| 653 |
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|a Competition
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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| 653 |
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|a Intergovernmental Relations: General
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| 653 |
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|a Budgeting
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| 653 |
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditure
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditures, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Budget
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| 653 |
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|a Tax incentives
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| 653 |
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|a Budgeting & financial management
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| 653 |
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|a National Budget
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
|
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|a Finance: General
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Martinez, Leonardo
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451875232.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/220/001.2004.issue-220-en.xml?cid=17769-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a This paper argues that both horizontal and intertemporal competition among recipient governments are needed in order to ensure incentives for effective utilization of targeted transfers. This has implications for budgeting frameworks and the types of information needed that might be amenable to formal contracting between the levels of government
|