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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451843552
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Josefsson, Mats
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a What Happens After Supervisory Intervention? Considering Bank Closure Options
|c Mats Josefsson, Michael Andrews
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2003
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| 300 |
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|a 25 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Kyrgyz Republic
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| 653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Distressed institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Commercial banks
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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| 653 |
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|a Industries: Financial Services
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| 653 |
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|a Financial sector policy and analysis
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| 653 |
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|a Bank resolution
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| 653 |
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|a Systemic crises
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| 653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Bankruptcy
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Deposit insurance
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| 653 |
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|a Crisis management
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: General
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| 653 |
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|a Liquidation
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services industry
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Bank solvency
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| 653 |
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|a Finance: General
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| 653 |
|
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|a Financial Crises
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Andrews, Michael
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451843552.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2003/017/001.2003.issue-017-en.xml?cid=16222-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Closures have been used to resolve problem banks in many countries in a wide range of economic circumstances, yet banking supervisors frequently defer intervention and closure. Avoiding the costs of disruption is the principal argument in favor of extraordinary measures, such as the use of public funds for recapitalization or forbearance, as alternatives to closing insolvent banks. Well-planned and implemented closure options can preserve essential functions performed by failing banks, mitigating disruption. Extraordinary measures to avoid closure should generally be avoided, but may be used in a systemic crisis to preserve some portion of a widely insolvent banking sector
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