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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451843262
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Wade, Paul
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a Rent Seeking and Endogenous Income Inequality
|c Paul Wade, Era Dabla-Norris
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2001
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| 300 |
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|a 29 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a China, People's Republic of
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| 653 |
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|a Civil service
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| 653 |
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|a Wealth
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| 653 |
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|a Income
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| 653 |
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|a Income distribution
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| 653 |
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|a Saving
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| 653 |
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|a Transaction Costs
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| 653 |
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|a Aggregate Labor Productivity
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| 653 |
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|a Unemployment
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| 653 |
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|a Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
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| 653 |
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|a Aggregate Human Capital
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| 653 |
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|a National accounts
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| 653 |
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|a Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
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| 653 |
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption; Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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| 653 |
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|a Organizational Behavior
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| 653 |
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|a Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Civil service & public sector
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Wages
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| 653 |
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|a Income inequality
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| 653 |
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|a Intergenerational Income Distribution
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| 653 |
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|a Property Rights
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| 653 |
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|a Employment
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Dabla-Norris, Era
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451843262.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/015/001.2001.issue-015-en.xml?cid=3981-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a This paper studies the relationship between wealth inequality and occupational choice between rent-seeking and production. With imperfect credit markets and a fixed cost to rent-seeking, only wealthy agents choose to engage in rent-seeking as it enables them to protect their wealth from expropriation. Hence, initial wealth determines occupational choice and aggregate economic activity. The model also generates an unequal wealth distribution endogenously through fair gambles undertaken voluntarily, despite agents being identical ex ante. If agents have an altruistic bequest motive, income and occupational differences can be perpetuated from generation to generation
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