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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451851915
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Baqir, Reza
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Districting and Government Overspending
|c Reza Baqir
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2001
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| 300 |
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|a 48 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United Kingdom
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| 653 |
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|a Population & demography
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| 653 |
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|a Income
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| 653 |
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|a Labour; income economics
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| 653 |
|
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|a State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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| 653 |
|
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|a Employment; Economic theory
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| 653 |
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|a Demographic Economics: General
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Income distribution
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| 653 |
|
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|a Personal income
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| 653 |
|
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|a Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
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| 653 |
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|a Public Goods
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| 653 |
|
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|a Aggregate Labor Productivity
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| 653 |
|
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|a Unemployment
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| 653 |
|
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|a Public employment
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| 653 |
|
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|a Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
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| 653 |
|
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|a Aggregate Human Capital
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| 653 |
|
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|a National accounts
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| 653 |
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|a Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
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| 653 |
|
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|a Labor
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| 653 |
|
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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| 653 |
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|a Population and demographics
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditure
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| 653 |
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|a Demography
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| 653 |
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|a Expenditures, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Population
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
|
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|a Wages
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| 653 |
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|a Income inequality
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| 653 |
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|a Intergenerational Income Distribution
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
|
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|a Employment
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/096/001.2001.issue-096-en.xml?cid=15173-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a The common-pool problem is a central issue in the relationship between the political structure of jurisdictions and the size of public spending. Models predict that, other things being equal, greater political districting of a jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents new evidence on this and related predictions from a cross-section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that one additional legislator is associated, on average, with 3 percent larger expenditures per capita. Evidence also suggests that forms of government with strong executives, particularly those with veto powers, break the link between districting and government size
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