|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
02660nmm a2200613 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB000931766 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000000725362 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9781451856958
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Fullenkamp, Connel
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Should Subsidized Private Transfers Replace Government Social Insurance?
|c Connel Fullenkamp, Ralph Chami
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2000
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 26 pages
|
| 651 |
|
4 |
|a United States
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Income
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Social assistance spending
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Optimal Taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Labour; income economics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public finance & taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Financial sector policy and analysis
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Taxes
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Labor markets
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Asymmetric and Private Information
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Demand and Supply of Labor: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a National accounts
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Labor
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Expenditure
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Financial risk management
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Tax allowances
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Efficiency
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Expenditures, Public
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Labor market
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Personal Finance -Taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Macroeconomics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Moral hazard
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Altruism
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Finance: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Income tax
|
| 700 |
1 |
|
|a Chami, Ralph
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
| 490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451856958.001
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2000/150/001.2000.issue-150-en.xml?cid=3730-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a Private transfers between individuals or through organized charities are increasingly viewed as an alternative for government social insurance programs. This paper models the incentive effects of government subsidized private transfers and finds that while there is a significant welfare benefit to subsidizing private transfers, there is also a significant welfare cost to this policy. It is shown analytically, as well as through simulations, that the optimal subsidy to private transfers is positive for a wide range of parameter values. This result indicates that subsidized private transfers in net terms are welfare enhancing
|