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150128 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781451865899
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100 |
1 |
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|a Taylor, Michael
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a The Fear of Freedom
|b Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors
|c Michael Taylor, Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2007
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300 |
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|a 50 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a United Kingdom
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653 |
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|a Public Administration
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653 |
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|a Banks
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653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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653 |
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|a Industries: Financial Services
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653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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653 |
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|a Mortgages
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653 |
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|a Legal support in revenue administration
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653 |
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|a Central banks
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653 |
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|a Public Sector Accounting and Audits
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653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: General
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653 |
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|a Banking
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653 |
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|a Business and Financial
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653 |
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|a Central bank autonomy
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653 |
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|a Economics of Regulation
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653 |
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|a Law and legislation
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653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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653 |
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|a Revenue administration
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653 |
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|a State supervision
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653 |
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|a Bank supervision
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653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
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653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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653 |
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|a Economic sectors
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653 |
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|a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
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653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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653 |
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|a Financial regulation and supervision
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653 |
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|a Financial services industry
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653 |
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|a Central Banks and Their Policies
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653 |
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|a Public Finance
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653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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653 |
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|a Revenue
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653 |
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|a Financial sector
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700 |
1 |
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|a Quintyn, Marc
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700 |
1 |
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|a Ramirez, Silvia
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451865899.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/025/001.2007.issue-025-en.xml?cid=20155-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a Compared with the case of central bank independence, independence for financial sector supervisors remains more controversial. This paper analyzes changes in independence and accountability arrangements in a set of 32 countries that overhauled their legal and/or institutional frameworks for supervision in recent years. Despite improvements, there is strong evidence that the endorsement of independence remains half-hearted, which shows itself through either overcompensation on the accountability side, or resort to political control mechanisms. The latter could potentially undermine the agency's credibility. The results indicate that policymakers still need to be persuaded of the long-term benefits of independence for financial sector soundness, and of the potential for a virtuous interaction between independence and accountability, if the arrangements are well-designed
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