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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451982633
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Weber, Anke
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Monetary Policy Committees, Learning and Communication
|c Anke Weber
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2010
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| 300 |
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|a 41 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United Kingdom
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| 653 |
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|a Supply and demand
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Inflation
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Economic Theory
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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| 653 |
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|a Output gap
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| 653 |
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|a Deflation
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Supply shocks
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| 653 |
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|a Economic theory & philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Production; Economic theory
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Production
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| 653 |
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|a Price Level
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Prices
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Agriculture: Aggregate Supply and Demand Analysis
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| 653 |
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|a Communications in revenue administration
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Revenue
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| 653 |
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|a Production and Operations Management
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451982633.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/085/001.2010.issue-085-en.xml?cid=23768-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a This paper considers optimal communication by monetary policy committees in a model of imperfect knowledge and learning. The main policy implications are that there may be costs to central bank communication if the public is perpetually learning about the committee's decision-making process and policy preferences. When committee members have heterogeneous policy preferences, welfare is greater under majority voting than under consensus decision-making. Furthermore, central bank communication under majority voting is more likely to be beneficial in this case. It is also shown that a chairman with stable policy preferences who carries significant weight in the monetary policy decision-making process is welfare enhancing
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