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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 9781455210831
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|a Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
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| 245 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Leverage, and Bank Risk Taking
|c Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Robert Marquez, Luc Laeven
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2010
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| 300 |
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|a 36 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Interest rates
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| 653 |
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|a Asset requirements
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| 653 |
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|a Credit
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| 653 |
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|a Capital adequacy requirements
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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| 653 |
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|a Industries: Financial Services
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Loans
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Bank credit
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
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| 653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Central bank policy rate
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Marquez, Robert
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Laeven, Luc
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781455210831.001
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| 856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2010/276/001.2010.issue-276-en.xml?cid=24424-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a We provide a theoretical foundation for the claim that prolonged periods of easy monetary conditions increase bank risk taking. The net effect of a monetary policy change on bank monitoring (an inverse measure of risk taking) depends on the balance of three forces: interest rate pass-through, risk shifting, and leverage. When banks can adjust their capital structures, a monetary easing leads to greater leverage and lower monitoring. However, if a bank's capital structure is fixed, the balance depends on the degree of bank capitalization: when facing a policy rate cut, well capitalized banks decrease monitoring, while highly levered banks increase it. Further, the balance of these effects depends on the structure and contestability of the banking industry, and is therefore likely to vary across countries and over time
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