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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 9781451863338
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|a Mendoza, Enrique
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|a Are Asset Price Guarantees Useful for Preventing Sudden Stops?A Quantitative Investigation of the Globalization Hazard-Moral Hazard Tradeoff
|c Enrique Mendoza, Ceyhun Bora Durdu
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2006
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|a 40 pages
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651 |
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|a Mexico
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|a Inflation
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|a Wealth
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|a Institutional Investors
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|a Stocks
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|a Pension Funds
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|a Finance
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|a Saving
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|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
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|a Deflation
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|a Financial Instruments
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|a Long-term Capital Movements
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|a Exports and Imports
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|a International economics
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|a Asset prices
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|a Price Level
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|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
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|a Consumption; Economics
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|a Financial risk management
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|a Investments: Stocks
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|a Consumption
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|a Prices
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|a Macroeconomics
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|a Sudden stops
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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|a Moral hazard
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|a Capital movements
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|a Investment & securities
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|a Finance: General
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|a International Investment
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|a Durdu, Ceyhun Bora
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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|a IMF Working Papers
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|a 10.5089/9781451863338.001
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2006/073/001.2006.issue-073-en.xml?cid=18883-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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|a An implication of the "globalization hazard" hypothesis is that sudden stops could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard by creating international moral hazard. We study this tradeoff using an equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by Fisher's debt-deflation process. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign asset demand, but their effectiveness and welfare implications depend critically on the price elasticity of foreign demand and on making the guarantees contingent on debt levels
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