Political Risk Aversion

This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in...

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Main Author: Valderrama, Laura
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2009, 2009
Series:IMF Working Papers; Working Paper
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Summary:This paper studies the effect of individual uncertainty on collective decision-making to implement innovation. We show how individual uncertainty creates a bias for the status quo even under irreversible voting decisions, in contrast with Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). Blocking innovation is rooted in the aversion to the potential loss of political clout in future voting decisions. Thus, risk neutral individuals exhibit what we call political risk aversion. Yet individual uncertainty is not all bad news as it may open the door to institutional reform. We endogenize institutional reform and show a non-monotonic relationship between institutional efficiency and the size of innovation
Physical Description:26 p.
ISBN:9781451873412
1451873417