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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 9781451873511
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a How to Stop a Herd of Running Bears? Market Response to Policy Initiatives during the Global Financial Crisis
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2009
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300 |
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|a 48 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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653 |
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|a Financial sector policy
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653 |
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|a Liquidity risk
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653 |
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|a Banks
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653 |
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|a Finance
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653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
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653 |
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|a Value of Firms
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653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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653 |
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|a Crisis management
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653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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653 |
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|a Mortgages
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653 |
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|a Financial risk management
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653 |
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|a Credit risk
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653 |
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|a Capital and Ownership Structure
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653 |
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|a Goodwill
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653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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653 |
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|a Financial services industry
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653 |
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|a Banking
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653 |
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|a Financial Risk and Risk Management
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653 |
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|a Financing Policy
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653 |
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|a Bank bailouts
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653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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653 |
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|a Finance: General
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710 |
2 |
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|a International Monetary Fund
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451873511.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2009/204/001.2009.issue-204-en.xml?cid=23293-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a This paper examines the impact of macroeconomic and financial sector policy announcements in the United States, the United Kingdom, the euro area, and Japan during the recent crisis on interbank credit and liquidity risk premia. Announcements of interest rate cuts, liquidity support, liability guarantees, and recapitalization were associated with a reduction of interbank risk premia, albeit to a different degree during the subprime and global phases of the crisis. Decisions not to reduce interest rates and bail out individual banks in an ad hoc manner had adverse repercussions, both domestically and abroad. The results are robust to controlling for the surprise content of announcements and using alternative measures of financial distress
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