Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game
This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played betwee...
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Format: | eBook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund
2002
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Series: | IMF Working Papers
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | |
Collection: | International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Summary: | This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood) |
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Physical Description: | 13 pages |
ISBN: | 9781451850376 |