|
|
|
|
| LEADER |
02402nmm a2200553 u 4500 |
| 001 |
EB000929744 |
| 003 |
EBX01000000000000000723340 |
| 005 |
00000000000000.0 |
| 007 |
cr||||||||||||||||||||| |
| 008 |
150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
|
|
|a 9781451870107
|
| 100 |
1 |
|
|a Alichi, Ali
|
| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a A Model of Sovereign Debt in Democracies
|c Ali Alichi
|
| 260 |
|
|
|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2008
|
| 300 |
|
|
|a 34 pages
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Insurance companies
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Institutional Investors
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Pension Funds
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public finance & taxation
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Industries: Financial Services
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Financial Instruments
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt Management
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Capital market
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debts, Public
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Exports and Imports
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a International economics
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a International Lending and Debt Problems
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debts, External
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Sovereign Debt
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a International capital markets
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Actuarial Studies
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Public Finance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Finance: General
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Insurance Companies
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Insurance
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Debt default
|
| 653 |
|
|
|a Insurance & actuarial studies
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
| 989 |
|
|
|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
| 490 |
0 |
|
|a IMF Working Papers
|
| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451870107.001
|
| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2008/152/001.2008.issue-152-en.xml?cid=21990-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
|
| 082 |
0 |
|
|a 330
|
| 520 |
|
|
|a This paper develops and empirically tests a political economy model of sovereign debt. The main incentive for repaying sovereign debt is to maintain access to international capital markets. However, in a democracy, one generation may choose default regardless of its consequences for future generations. An old generation with little concern for its country's access to capital markets can force a default on debt if it has the majority of voters. On the other hand, if the younger generation is more numerous, it can force repayment of previously defaulted debt. Other voter heterogeneities, such as in income, can generate similar results
|