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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 9781451846553
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Poirson, Hélène
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a How Do Countries Choose their Exchange Rate Regime?
|c Hélène Poirson
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2001
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| 300 |
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|a 33 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rate arrangements
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| 653 |
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|a International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Currency; Foreign exchange
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| 653 |
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|a Value of Firms
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| 653 |
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|a Open Economy Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Economic Development: General
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign Exchange
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| 653 |
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|a Conventional peg
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| 653 |
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|a Financial risk management
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| 653 |
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|a Capital and Ownership Structure
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| 653 |
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|a Goodwill
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rate flexibility
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Financial regulation and supervision
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk and Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rates
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| 653 |
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|a Financing Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rate risk
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| 653 |
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|a Financial services law & regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign exchange
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451846553.001
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2001/046/001.2001.issue-046-en.xml?cid=4064-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a This paper investigates the determinants of exchange rate regime choice in 93 countries during 1990-98. Cross-country analysis of variations in international reserves and nominal exchange rates shows that (i) truly fixed pegs and independent floats differ significantly from other regimes and (ii) significant discrepancies exist between de jure and de facto flexibility. Regression results highlight the influence of political factors (political instability and government temptation to inflate), adequacy of reserves, dollarization (currency substitution), exchange rate risk exposure, and some traditional optimal currency area criteria, in particular capital mobility, on exchange rate regime selection
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