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150128 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781451854466
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100 |
1 |
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|a Cashin, Paul
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Tax Smoothing in a Financially Repressed Economy
|b Evidence from India
|c Paul Cashin, Nilss Olekalns, Ratna Sahay
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1998
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300 |
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|a 43 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a India
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653 |
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|a Institutional Investors
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653 |
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|a Stocks
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653 |
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|a Pension Funds
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653 |
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|a Optimal Taxation
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653 |
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|a Budget Systems
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653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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653 |
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|a Government debt management
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653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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653 |
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|a Financial Instruments
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653 |
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|a National Deficit Surplus
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653 |
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|a Debt Management
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653 |
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|a Fiscal Policy
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653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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653 |
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|a Debt
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653 |
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|a Budget planning and preparation
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653 |
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|a Fiscal policy
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653 |
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|a Budgeting
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653 |
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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653 |
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|a Expenditure
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653 |
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|a Non-bank Financial Institutions
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653 |
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|a Investments: Stocks
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653 |
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|a Efficiency
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653 |
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|a Expenditures, Public
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653 |
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|a Budget
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Public financial management (PFM)
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653 |
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|a National Budget
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653 |
|
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|a Budgeting & financial management
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653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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653 |
|
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|a Public Finance
|
700 |
1 |
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|a Olekalns, Nilss
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700 |
1 |
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|a Sahay, Ratna
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
|
989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451854466.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1998/122/001.1998.issue-122-en.xml?cid=2715-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a India has a long history of running fiscal deficits. Two broad considerations motivate a government to run a deficit: tax smoothing and tax tilting. This paper tests a version of Barro’s tax-smoothing model, using Indian data for the period 1951-52 to 1996-97. The empirical results indicate that the central government of India has tax-smoothed, while the regional governments of India have not. The paper also finds evidence of tax tilting, reflected in financial repression, which has led to the accumulation of excessive public liabilities
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