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150128 ||| eng |
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|a 9781451850918
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Ohashi, Kazunari
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Japan’s Distressed-Debt Market
|c Kazunari Ohashi, Manmohan Singh
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2004
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| 300 |
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|a 29 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Japan
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Distressed assets
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Industries: Financial Services
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Nonperforming loans
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| 653 |
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|a Collateral
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| 653 |
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|a Loans
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Finance: General
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Singh, Manmohan
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451850918.001
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| 856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/086/001.2004.issue-086-en.xml?cid=17239-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Sizable risk capital from outside may be necessary to accelerate Japan's corporate restructuring to replace the stock of impaired bank loans. To attract risk capital, impaired loans must find market-clearing prices. However, the asymmetry in the bid-ask prices faced by banks and distressed-debt investors continues to stall efforts to create a liquid distressed-debt market. This paper asserts that the wedge between the prices faced by different participants is primarily a result of different valuation methods employed by banks and distressed-debt investors. On the one hand, banks do not recognize "maturity default" that results in banks rolling over impaired-loan accounts, effectively turning them into perpetual debt, which is expected to capture any upside potential for value. On the other hand, distressed-debt investors presently view their investments as equity stakes that require improved cash flows, unlike the buy-and-sell distressed-collateral market that existed in the mid-1990s. We suggest that bids from distressed-debt investors may not be as low as they are deemed by local banks and the asymmetry in prices may be reduced if banks value their claims as corporate equity
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