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150128 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781451867831
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100 |
1 |
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|a Faal, Ebrima
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea
|c Ebrima Faal
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2007
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300 |
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|a 16 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a Papua New Guinea
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653 |
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|a Business cycles
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653 |
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures
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653 |
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|a Total expenditures
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653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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653 |
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|a Fiscal Policy
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653 |
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|a Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
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653 |
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|a Fiscal policy
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653 |
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|a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
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653 |
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|a Expenditure
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653 |
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|a Economic growth
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653 |
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|a Public-private sector cooperation
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653 |
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|a Expenditures, Public
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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653 |
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|a Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP)
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653 |
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|a Public Finance
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
|
490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451867831.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2007/219/001.2007.issue-219-en.xml?cid=21281-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a This paper assesses the presence of opportunistic electoral budget cycles in Papua New Guinea. Using quarterly time series data, a clear pattern emerges of pre-election manipulations of fiscal policy by incumbent governments, mainly in the form of increased development spending and overall primary expenditure, followed in some cases by retrenchment in post-election periods. These findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory. It is noteworthy that revenue was not statistically significantly related to elections, either in the pre- or post-election period. In this regard, electoral swings in fiscal deficits reflect a preference for influencing expenditures rather than taxation
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