Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea

This paper assesses the presence of opportunistic electoral budget cycles in Papua New Guinea. Using quarterly time series data, a clear pattern emerges of pre-election manipulations of fiscal policy by incumbent governments, mainly in the form of increased development spending and overall primary e...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Faal, Ebrima
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2007
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea  |c Ebrima Faal 
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300 |a 16 pages 
651 4 |a Papua New Guinea 
653 |a Business cycles 
653 |a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures 
653 |a Total expenditures 
653 |a Public finance & taxation 
653 |a Fiscal Policy 
653 |a Fiscal policy 
653 |a Other Public Investment and Capital Stock 
653 |a National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General 
653 |a Expenditure 
653 |a Economic growth 
653 |a Public-private sector cooperation 
653 |a Expenditures, Public 
653 |a Macroeconomics 
653 |a Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles: General (includes Measurement and Data) 
653 |a Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) 
653 |a Public Finance 
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520 |a This paper assesses the presence of opportunistic electoral budget cycles in Papua New Guinea. Using quarterly time series data, a clear pattern emerges of pre-election manipulations of fiscal policy by incumbent governments, mainly in the form of increased development spending and overall primary expenditure, followed in some cases by retrenchment in post-election periods. These findings are consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory. It is noteworthy that revenue was not statistically significantly related to elections, either in the pre- or post-election period. In this regard, electoral swings in fiscal deficits reflect a preference for influencing expenditures rather than taxation