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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451855456
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Daniel, Betty
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| 245 |
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|a Fiscal Policy and the Predictability of Exchange Rate Collapse
|c Betty Daniel
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1997
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| 300 |
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|a 18 pages
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign exchange reserves
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| 653 |
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|a Credit
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| 653 |
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|a Wealth
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| 653 |
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|a International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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| 653 |
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|a Currency; Foreign exchange
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| 653 |
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|a Saving
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| 653 |
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|a Open Economy Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Domestic credit
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign Exchange
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| 653 |
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|a International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption; Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Conventional peg
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| 653 |
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|a International reserves
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rates
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign exchange
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451855456.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1997/133/001.1997.issue-133-en.xml?cid=2367-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a It is well known that the long-run viability of a fixed exchange rate regime imposes constraints on monetary policy. This paper shows that, in a model with forward-looking agents, short-run viability imposes a fiscal constraint. When policy change, which destroys long-run viability, also violates the fiscal constraint, collapse is instantaneous. Delayed predictable collapse requires satisfaction of the fiscal constraint
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