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150128 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9781451859843
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100 |
1 |
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|a Bonato, Leo
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245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Work Absence in Europe
|c Leo Bonato, Lusine Lusinyan
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260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2004
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300 |
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|a 44 pages
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651 |
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4 |
|a United Kingdom
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653 |
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|a Unemployment Insurance
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653 |
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|a Time Allocation and Labor Supply
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653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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653 |
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|a Employment protection
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653 |
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|a Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
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653 |
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|a Spatio-temporal Models
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653 |
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|a Labor
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653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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653 |
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|a Actuarial Studies
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653 |
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|a Income economics
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653 |
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|a Insurance
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653 |
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|a Provision and Effects of Welfare Program
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653 |
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|a Labour
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653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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653 |
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|a Unemployment
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653 |
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|a Labor Contracts
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653 |
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|a Regulation
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653 |
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|a Demand and Supply of Labor: General
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653 |
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|a Expenditure
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653 |
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|a Labor supply
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653 |
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|a Manpower policy
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653 |
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|a Severance Pay
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653 |
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|a Labor Economics: General
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653 |
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|a Panel Data Models
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653 |
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|a Plant Closings
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653 |
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|a Labor market
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653 |
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|a Public Health
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653 |
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|a Unemployment benefits
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653 |
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|a Unemployment insurance
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653 |
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|a Public Finance
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653 |
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|a Health: Government Policy
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653 |
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|a Government Policy
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653 |
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|a Insurance Companies
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653 |
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|a Insurance & actuarial studies
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653 |
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|a Labor economics
|
700 |
1 |
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|a Lusinyan, Lusine
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041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451859843.001
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856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2004/193/001.2004.issue-193-en.xml?cid=17712-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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520 |
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|a Work absence is an important part of the individual decision on actual working hours. This paper focuses on sickness absence in Europe and develops a stylized model where absence is part of the labor-leisure decision made by workers and the production decision made by profit-maximizing firms, with insurance provisions and labor market institutions affecting the costs of absence. The results from a panel of 18 European countries indicate that absence is increased by generous insurance schemes where employers bear little responsibility for their costs. Shorter working hours reduce absence, but flexible working arrangements are preferable if labor supply erosion is a concern
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