Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs

When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resour...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni
Other Authors: Cordella, Tito
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2002
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
LEADER 02064nmm a2200409 u 4500
001 EB000928040
003 EBX01000000000000000721636
005 00000000000000.0
007 cr|||||||||||||||||||||
008 150128 ||| eng
020 |a 9781451853872 
100 1 |a Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni 
245 0 0 |a Limits of Conditionality in Poverty Reduction Programs  |c Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Tito Cordella 
260 |a Washington, D.C.  |b International Monetary Fund  |c 2002 
300 |a 24 pages 
653 |a Provision and Effects of Welfare Program 
653 |a Debt relief 
653 |a Finance 
653 |a Debt Management 
653 |a Debt 
653 |a Poverty reduction 
653 |a Social welfare & social services 
653 |a Debts, External 
653 |a Social Services and Welfare 
653 |a Sovereign Debt 
653 |a Poverty reduction strategy 
653 |a Poverty 
653 |a Financial Risk Management 
653 |a Government Policy 
700 1 |a Cordella, Tito 
041 0 7 |a eng  |2 ISO 639-2 
989 |b IMF  |a International Monetary Fund 
490 0 |a IMF Working Papers 
028 5 0 |a 10.5089/9781451853872.001 
856 4 0 |u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2002/115/001.2002.issue-115-en.xml?cid=15838-com-dsp-marc  |x Verlag  |3 Volltext 
082 0 |a 330 
520 |a When donors and recipients have different preferences over budgetary allocations, conditionality helps the implementation of donor-financed poverty reduction programs. However, if donors cannot perfectly monitor all recipients' actions, conditionality entails an inefficient allocation of resources. Under such conditions, the optimal amount of conditionality varies (often not monotonically) with the recipients' degree of social commitment. Finally, if recipients' preferences are not observable, conditionality can be used to prevent recipients with a weak commitment to poverty reduction from obtaining aid funds. This may however lead to further distortions in terms of resource allocation and to phenomena of "aid rationing."