Centralized Bargaining, Efficiency Wages, and Flexibility

The main focus of the “wage bargaining” literature has been on the factors promoting real wage flexibility at the macro level. This paper, in contrast, examines the microeconomic issues of wage bargaining. More specifically, this paper appraises the following questions: (a) what are the conditions u...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ramaswamy, Ramana
Other Authors: Rowthorn, Bob
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 1993
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
LEADER 02069nmm a2200385 u 4500
001 EB000927433
003 EBX01000000000000000721029
005 00000000000000.0
007 cr|||||||||||||||||||||
008 150128 ||| eng
020 |a 9781451844191 
100 1 |a Ramaswamy, Ramana 
245 0 0 |a Centralized Bargaining, Efficiency Wages, and Flexibility  |c Ramana Ramaswamy, Bob Rowthorn 
260 |a Washington, D.C.  |b International Monetary Fund  |c 1993 
300 |a 32 pages 
651 4 |a Sweden 
653 |a Real wages 
653 |a Labour; income economics 
653 |a Wage adjustments 
653 |a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General 
653 |a Labor 
653 |a Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy 
653 |a Labor Economics: General 
653 |a Macroeconomics 
653 |a Wages 
653 |a Wage bargaining 
653 |a Labor economics 
700 1 |a Rowthorn, Bob 
041 0 7 |a eng  |2 ISO 639-2 
989 |b IMF  |a International Monetary Fund 
490 0 |a IMF Working Papers 
028 5 0 |a 10.5089/9781451844191.001 
856 4 0 |u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1993/025/001.1993.issue-025-en.xml?cid=732-com-dsp-marc  |x Verlag  |3 Volltext 
082 0 |a 330 
520 |a The main focus of the “wage bargaining” literature has been on the factors promoting real wage flexibility at the macro level. This paper, in contrast, examines the microeconomic issues of wage bargaining. More specifically, this paper appraises the following questions: (a) what are the conditions under which a firm prefers decentralized to centralized bargaining?, (b) what are the characteristic features of firms which prefer decentralized to centralized bargaining?, and (c) has the proportion of firms which prefer decentralized bargaining increased over time? These questions are examined in an efficiency wage model with insider-outsider features. This paper provides useful theoretical insights for understanding the issues involved in shifting from centralized to decentralized wage bargaining