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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781462313327
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Debrun, Xavier
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies
|c Xavier Debrun
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 2011
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| 300 |
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|a 15 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United Kingdom
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| 653 |
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|a Inflation
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| 653 |
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|a Public debt
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| 653 |
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|a Budget Systems
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Designs and Consistency
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| 653 |
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|a Deflation
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| 653 |
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|a National Deficit Surplus
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
|
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|a Budget planning and preparation
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| 653 |
|
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|a Fiscal policy
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| 653 |
|
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|a Budgeting
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| 653 |
|
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|a Central banks
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Price Level
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Objectives
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| 653 |
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|a Policy Coordination
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Budget
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| 653 |
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|a Prices
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Public financial management (PFM)
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| 653 |
|
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
|
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|a Central Banks and Their Policies
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| 653 |
|
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|a National Budget
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| 653 |
|
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|a Budgeting & financial management
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| 653 |
|
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|a Central bank autonomy
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| 653 |
|
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|a Public Finance
|
| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
|
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781462313327.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2011/173/001.2011.issue-173-en.xml?cid=25091-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on "fiscal councils" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing "commitment technologies" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline
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