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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451846157
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Lane, Timothy
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| 245 |
0 |
0 |
|a Market Discipline
|c Timothy Lane
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1992
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| 300 |
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|a 50 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Public debt
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and banking
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| 653 |
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|a Debt Management
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, Public
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| 653 |
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|a Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Deposit insurance
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
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| 653 |
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|a Exports and Imports
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| 653 |
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|a Crisis management
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal policy
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a International Lending and Debt Problems
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| 653 |
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|a International economics
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| 653 |
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|a External debt
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| 653 |
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|a Debts, External
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign Debt
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Debt financing
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| 653 |
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|a Debt default
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
|
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
0 |
|a 10.5089/9781451846157.001
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| 856 |
4 |
0 |
|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1992/042/001.1992.issue-042-en.xml?cid=792-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
0 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Under what circumstances can market forces prevent unsustainable borrowing? Effective market discipline requires that capital markets be open, that; information on the borrower’s existing liabilities be readily available, that no bailout be anticipated, and that the borrower respond to market signals. This paper explores the implications of these conditions, and reviews some relevant empirical evidence
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