Bank Capitalization As a Signal

The level of a bank's capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping ca...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hardy, Daniel
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Washington, D.C. International Monetary Fund 2012
Series:IMF Working Papers
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: International Monetary Fund - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
Description
Summary:The level of a bank's capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banks' creditors often cannot distinguish among them - tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies
Physical Description:25 pages
ISBN:9781475503357