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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451921175
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Frenkel, Jacob
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a International Vat Harmonization
|b Economic Effects
|c Jacob Frenkel, Steven Symansky, Assaf Razin
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1991
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| 300 |
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|a 48 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United Kingdom
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| 653 |
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|a Wealth
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| 653 |
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|a Revenue administration
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| 653 |
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|a Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Taxes
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| 653 |
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|a Saving
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| 653 |
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|a Corporations
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| 653 |
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|a National accounts
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| 653 |
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|a Business Taxes and Subsidies
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption taxes
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| 653 |
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|a Income tax systems
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Corporate & business tax
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| 653 |
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|a Corporate Taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Cash-flow tax
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| 653 |
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|a Value-added tax
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Spendings tax
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| 653 |
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|a Revenue
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| 653 |
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|a Income tax
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Razin, Assaf
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Symansky, Steven
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451921175.001
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1991/022/001.1991.issue-022-en.xml?cid=898-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a This paper highlights key macroeconomic issues related to VAT harmonization. A model is developed which emphasizes the effects of changes in the time profile of various taxes on international behavior. Dynamic simulations reveal that the macroeconomic and welfare implications of VAT harmonization, including conflicts of interest, depend critically on the tax system and the degree of substitution governing temporal and intertemporal allocations. We also demonstrate that the effects of revenue-neutral tax conversions between income and consumption tax systems undertaken by a single country depend critically on international differences in behavior
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