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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451954333
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| 245 |
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|a Optimal Fiscal Policy and Government Provision of Contingent Liabilities
|b The Example of Government Loan and Deposit Guarantees
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1989
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| 300 |
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|a 28 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a United States
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| 653 |
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|a Depository Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Sovereign bonds
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| 653 |
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|a Public Administration
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| 653 |
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|a Wealth
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| 653 |
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|a Banks
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| 653 |
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|a Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Public finance & taxation
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| 653 |
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|a Industries: Financial Services
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| 653 |
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|a Financial institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Saving
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| 653 |
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|a Micro Finance Institutions
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| 653 |
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|a Fiscal policy
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| 653 |
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|a General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
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| 653 |
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|a Mortgages
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| 653 |
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|a Investments: Bonds
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| 653 |
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|a National accounts
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| 653 |
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|a Loans
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption; Economics
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| 653 |
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|a Bonds
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| 653 |
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|a Contingent liabilities
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| 653 |
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|a Public Sector Accounting and Audits
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| 653 |
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|a Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Public financial management (PFM)
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| 653 |
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|a Macroeconomics: Consumption
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| 653 |
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|a Investment & securities
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| 653 |
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|a Public Finance
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| 653 |
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|a Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants
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| 653 |
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|a Loan guarantees
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| 710 |
2 |
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|a International Monetary Fund
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| 041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451954333.001
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| 856 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1989/084/001.1989.issue-084-en.xml?cid=29104-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a The optimal provision of loan guarantees or deposit insurance is examined in the context of an overlapping generations model. It is demonstrated that even in the face of a market imperfection that precludes diversification of the private sector’s loan portfolio to eliminate risk, full government guarantee of private sector loans (or deposits) is suboptimal. The results of the paper suggest that although some degree of guarantee is appropriate, the design of such policies should be tempered to avoid an inefficient level of capital accumulation
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