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150128 ||| eng |
| 020 |
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|a 9781451955545
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Bléjer, Mario
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| 245 |
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0 |
|a Deja Vu All Over Again? the Mexican Crisis and the Stabilization of Uruguay in the 1970's
|c Mario Bléjer, Graciana Castillo
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| 260 |
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|a Washington, D.C.
|b International Monetary Fund
|c 1996
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| 300 |
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|a 34 pages
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| 651 |
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4 |
|a Mexico
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| 653 |
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|a Economic & financial crises & disasters
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign exchange reserves
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| 653 |
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|a Credit
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| 653 |
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|a Short-term Capital Movements
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| 653 |
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|a Financial crises
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary economics
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| 653 |
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|a Current Account Adjustment
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
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| 653 |
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|a Open Economy Macroeconomics
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| 653 |
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|a Currency
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| 653 |
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|a Factor Movement
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| 653 |
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|a Money
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| 653 |
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|a Central banks
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| 653 |
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|a Domestic credit
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign Exchange
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| 653 |
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|a International reserves
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign Exchange Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Banks and Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rate policy
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| 653 |
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|a Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Banking
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| 653 |
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|a Exchange rates
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Risk Management
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| 653 |
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|a Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Money and Monetary Policy
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| 653 |
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|a Foreign exchange
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| 653 |
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|a Financial Crises
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| 700 |
1 |
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|a Castillo, Graciana
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| 041 |
0 |
7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b IMF
|a International Monetary Fund
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| 490 |
0 |
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|a IMF Working Papers
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| 028 |
5 |
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|a 10.5089/9781451955545.001
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| 856 |
4 |
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|u https://elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/1996/080/001.1996.issue-080-en.xml?cid=1902-com-dsp-marc
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 330
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| 520 |
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|a Comparing the 1978-82 Uruguayan stabilization with the 1990-94 Mexican experience reveals that exchange rate based stabilization tends to increase the economy’s vulnerability to unexpected shocks. An exchange rate rule, with full capital mobility, can only succeed if compatible financial policies are strictly adhered to--even when severe negative shocks take place--and if reliance on persistent capital inflows is not essential. This requires monetary restraint, even under serious recessionary conditions, and tight fiscal policies to moderate interest rates. The epilogues of both experiences demonstrate that abandoning the exchange rate rule in the wake of a shock, even if inevitable, makes future stabilization more difficult
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