Voting for policy, not parties how voters compensate for power sharing
This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms fa...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2009
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| Series: | Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Cambridge Books Online - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- Voting for policy. Introduction: institutional sources of voter choice ; A theory of compensatory vote
- Empirical evidence: how voters compensate for diffusion of power. Compensatory vote in parliamentary democracies ; Balancing strong (and weak) presidents ; Compensatory vote in federations: evidence from Germany
- Theoretical implications