Partisan bonds political reputations and legislative accountability

Political scientists have long painted American voters' dependence on partisan cues at the ballot box as a discouraging consequence of their overall ignorance about politics. Taking on this conventional wisdom, Jeffrey D. Grynaviski advances the provocative theory that voters instead rely on th...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Grynaviski, Jeffrey D.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2010
Series:Political economy of institutions and decisions
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Cambridge Books Online - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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505 0 |a Theory -- Voter learning about parties -- Party unity and the strength of party preferences -- Reconciling candidate and party brand names -- Brand names and party strategy 
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520 |a Political scientists have long painted American voters' dependence on partisan cues at the ballot box as a discouraging consequence of their overall ignorance about politics. Taking on this conventional wisdom, Jeffrey D. Grynaviski advances the provocative theory that voters instead rely on these cues because party brand names provide credible information about how politicians are likely to act in office, despite the weakness of formal party organization in the United States. Among the important empirical implications of his theory, which he carefully supports with rigorous data analysis, are that voter uncertainty about a party's issue positions varies with the level of party unity it exhibits in government, that party preferences in the electorate are strongest among the most certain voters, and that party brand names have meaningful consequences for the electoral strategies of party leaders and individual candidates for office