Accounting for ministers scandal and survival in British government, 1945-2007

Accounting for Ministers uses the tools of modern political science to analyse the factors which determine the fortunes of Cabinet ministers. Utilising agency theory, it describes Cabinet government as a system of incentives for prime ministerial and parliamentary rule. The authors use a unique data...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Berlinski, Samuel, Dewan, Torun A. (Author), Dowding, Keith M. (Author)
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Cambridge Books Online - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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245 0 0 |a Accounting for ministers  |b scandal and survival in British government, 1945-2007  |c Samuel Berlinski, Torun Dewan, Keith Dowding 
260 |a Cambridge  |b Cambridge University Press  |c 2012 
300 |a x 197 pages  |b digital 
505 0 |a 1. Introduction -- 2. Managing the Cabinet: principal-agent relations in government -- 3. The structure of British government -- 4. Who serves in government and how long do they last? -- 5. The Prime Minister and cabinet -- 6. Performance measures and forced exits -- 7. Ministerial performance and tenure -- 8. Conclusion 
653 |a Cabinet officers / Great Britain 
653 |a Cabinet system / Great Britain 
700 1 |a Dewan, Torun A.  |e [author] 
700 1 |a Dowding, Keith M.  |e [author] 
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520 |a Accounting for Ministers uses the tools of modern political science to analyse the factors which determine the fortunes of Cabinet ministers. Utilising agency theory, it describes Cabinet government as a system of incentives for prime ministerial and parliamentary rule. The authors use a unique dataset of ministers from 1945 to 2007 to examine the structural and individual characteristics that lead to the selection and durability of ministers. Sensitive to historical context, it describes the unique features of different Prime Ministers and the sorts of issues and scandals that lead to the forced exit of ministers. The authors identify the structural factors that determine ministerial performance and tenure, seeing resignation calls as performance indicators. Probing the nature of individual and collective responsibility within Westminster forms of government, its rigorous analysis provides powerful new insights into the nature of Cabinet government