Unprincipled virtue an inquiry into moral agency

Conventional thinking about the mind, dating back to Aristotle envisions the emotions as being directed and determined by rational thought. The author argues that the conventional picture of rationality is fundamentally false and has little to do with how real human beings actually behave

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Arpaly, Nomy
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford Oxford University Press 2002, 2002
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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