Rethinking the good moral ideals and the nature of practical reasoning

In choosing between moral alternatives we typically make calculations of the following kind, using the principle of transitivity: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. Temkin shows that if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make thes...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Temkin, Larry S.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: New York Oxford University Press 2012, c2012
Series:Oxford ethics series / Oxford ethics series
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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520 |a In choosing between moral alternatives we typically make calculations of the following kind, using the principle of transitivity: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. Temkin shows that if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions