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180413 ||| eng |
020 |
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|a 9780199786367
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020 |
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|a 0199786364
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050 |
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4 |
|a Q175.32.I54
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100 |
1 |
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|a Stanford, P. Kyle
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245 |
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|a Exceeding our grasp
|h Elektronische Ressource
|b science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives
|c P. Kyle Stanford
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260 |
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|a Oxford
|b Oxford University Press
|c 2006, 2006
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300 |
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|a xiv, 234 p.
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505 |
0 |
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|a Includes bibliographical references and index
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653 |
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|a Inference
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653 |
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|a Reasoning
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653 |
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|a Science / Philosophy
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041 |
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7 |
|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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989 |
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|b OUP
|a Oxford University Press
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856 |
4 |
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|u http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0195174089.001.0001?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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|a 501
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520 |
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|a This volume argues that history reveals our routine failure to even conceive of well-confirmed alternatives to our scientific theories, and similar alternatives to our own theories likely remain unconceived. It shows why defences of scientific realism cannot evade the problem and proposes an alternative image of the scientific enterprise
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