A metaphysics for freedom

Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself - not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Steward, Helen
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Oxford Oxford University Press 2012, 2012
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Oxford University Press - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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520 |a Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself - not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom