Mental Representation and Consciousness Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference

conditions of the possibility of Experience ... must mean nothing else than all that which lies immanently in the essence of Experience ... and therefore belongs to it indispensably. The essence of Experience that phenomenological analysis of Experience elucidates is the same as the possibility of E...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Marbach, E.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 1993, 1993
Edition:1st ed. 1993
Series:Contributions to Phenomenology, In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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505 0 |a Introduction: Mental Representation in Cognitive Science and the Point of View of the Phenomenology of Consciousness -- 1: Methodological Preliminaries -- 2: Reference to Something in Activities of Presentation -- 3: Phenomenological Forms of Purely Mental Representation -- 4: Reference to Something Identical in its Present Givenness: The Notion of “Implicit Consciousness” -- 5: The Phenomenological Form of Pictorial Representation -- 6: Reiterations, Transformations and Combinations of Purely Mental and Pictorial Representations -- Conclusion: Two Basic Phenomenological Forms of Intuitive Mental Representation -- Appendix: Short Presentation of the Different Elements of the Phenomenological Notation 
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520 |a conditions of the possibility of Experience ... must mean nothing else than all that which lies immanently in the essence of Experience ... and therefore belongs to it indispensably. The essence of Experience that phenomenological analysis of Experience elucidates is the same as the possibility of Experience, and all that which is determined in the essence, in the possibility of Experience, is eo ipso 1 condition of the possibility of Experience. Through acquaintance with Husserl's work, then, I developed my way of understand­ ing what, according to their very possibility, lies in conscious activities of mentally representing something, for example, by imagining or remembering it, or by viewing it in a picture, all these understood as forms of modified perception. As Husserl himself made clear, such reflective and descriptive analyses of the mental activities according to their very possibility are carried out regardless of the way they have actually come to be. However, I was also interested in developmen­ tal questions, especially with regard to the activity of imagining. Hence I turned to cognitive developmental psychology in order to get acquainted with the neces­ sary empirical material. Moreover, I conducted a pilot-study with young children that I had conceived according to phenomenologically relevant aspects concerning the difference and yet inner connection of the activities of imagining and viewing 2 pictures