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140122 ||| eng |
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|a 9789401592338
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|a Peregrin, J.
|e [editor]
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| 245 |
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|a Truth and Its Nature (if Any)
|h Elektronische Ressource
|c edited by J. Peregrin
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| 250 |
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|a 1st ed. 1999
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| 260 |
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|a Dordrecht
|b Springer Netherlands
|c 1999, 1999
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| 300 |
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|a XVIII, 221 p
|b online resource
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| 505 |
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|a I. Past Masters on Truth -- Frege: Assertion, Truth and Meaning -- Carnap, Syntax, and Truth -- James’s Conception of Truth -- II. Tarski and Correspondence -- Semantic Conception of Truth as a Philosophical Theory -- Truth, Correspondence, Satisfaction -- Do We Need Correspondence Truth? -- Tarskian Truth as Correspondence — Replies to Some Objections -- III. The Substantiality of Truth -- The Centrality of Truth -- Mapping the Structure of Truth: Davidson Contra Rorty -- The Explanatory Value of Truth Theoriesembodying the Semantic Conception -- Negative Truth and Knowledge -- IV. The Insubstantiality of Truth: The Pros and Cons of Deflationism -- Deflationary Truth, Aboutness and Meaning -- The Substance of Deflation -- Does the Strategy of Austerity Work? -- Rethinking the Concept of Truth: A Critique of Deflationism
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy, Modern
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| 653 |
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|a Philosophy of Language
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| 653 |
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|a Early Modern Philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Language and languages / Philosophy
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| 653 |
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|a Logic
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| 653 |
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|a Knowledge, Theory of
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| 653 |
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|a Semiotics
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| 653 |
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|a Epistemology
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| 041 |
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|a eng
|2 ISO 639-2
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| 989 |
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|b SBA
|a Springer Book Archives -2004
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| 490 |
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|a Synthese Library, Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science
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| 028 |
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|a 10.1007/978-94-015-9233-8
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| 856 |
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|u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9233-8?nosfx=y
|x Verlag
|3 Volltext
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| 082 |
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|a 149.94
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| 520 |
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|a The question how to turn the principles implicitly governing the concept of truth into an explicit definition (or explication) of the concept hence coalesced with the question how to get a finite grip on the infinity of T-sentences. Tarski's famous and ingenious move was to introduce a new concept, satisfaction, which could be, on the one hand, recursively defined, and which, on the other hand, straightforwardly yielded an explication of truth. A surprising 'by-product' of Tarski's effort to bring truth under control was the breathtaking finding that truth is in a precisely defined sense ineffable, that no non trivial language can contain a truth-predicate which would be adequate for the very 4 language . This implied that truth (and consequently semantic concepts to which truth appeared to be reducible) proved itself to be strangely 'language-dependent': we can have a concept of truth-in-L for any language L, but we cannot have a concept of truth applicable to every language. In a sense, this means, as Quine (1969, p. 68) put it, that truth belongs to "transcendental metaphysics", and Tarski's 'scientific' investigations seem to lead us back towards a surprising proximity of some more traditional philosophical views on truth. 3. TARSKI'S THEORY AS A PARADIGM So far Tarski himself. Subsequent philosophers then had to find out what his considerations of the concept of truth really mean and what are their consequences; and this now seems to be an almost interminable task
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