Human Action, Deliberation and Causation
There is an interesting and far-reaching disagreement between Smith and Frederick Stoutland. In his 'The Real Reasons' Stoutland argues that one of the mistakes that turned the belief-desire model of action into the 'received view' is the underlying commitment to the idea that th...
| Other Authors: | , |
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Dordrecht
Springer Netherlands
1998, 1998
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 1998 |
| Series: | Philosophical Studies Series
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- I: Deliberation
- The Possibility of Philosophy of Action
- The Real Reasons
- Reasons and the First Person
- Freedom in Belief and Desire
- Goodwill, Determinism and Justification
- Making X Happen: Prolepsis and the Problem of Mental Determination
- II: Causation
- Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior
- What Can the Semantic Properties of Innate Representations Explain?
- The Efficacy of Content: A Functionalist Theory
- Two Claims that Can Save a Nonreductive Account of Mental Causation
- What We Do: a Nonreductive Approach to Human Action
- Robust Activity, Event-Causation, and Agent-Causation
- Name Index