Winston Churchill and the German Question in British Foreign Policy 1918–1922
It was in the early summer of 1906 that Violet Bonham Carter first met Winston Churchill: an encounter which left an "indelible im pression" upon her. "I found myself," she recalled, sitting next to this young man who seemed to me quite different from any other young man I had e...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Dordrecht
Springer Netherlands
1973, 1973
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 1973 |
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| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- I: peacemaking with Germany, 1918–1919
- i. The Conclusion of an Armistice: “Effectual Guarantees” or Unconditional Surrender
- ii. Responsibility and Retribution
- iii. Safeguards and Security: Churchill’s attitude to Allied military occupation, and his attempts to create an independent Rhineland
- iv. Easing the Blockade : Churchill’s Aldwych Club speech and his plan to counter the spread of Bolshevism in Germany
- v. Churchill’s Critique of the Paris Peace Conference
- II: the Russo-German Question, 1918–1920
- i. The Menace of Russo-German Conjunction
- ii. The Case for Preventive War 66
- iii. The Military Situation in Russia: Churchill’s assessments and their impact upon his attitude towards Germany, January–April 1919
- iv. The anti-Bolshevists Fail to Sustain their Offensive : Churchill suggests an Anglo-German modus vivendi as a complementary check against conjunction, May–December 1919
- v. Churchill Resolves to Abandon the anti-Bolshevist Cause, January– February 1920
- vi. “The Very Great and Imminent Danger” of Polish Collapse, July–August 1920: Churchill again proposes an Anglo-German agreement to deter conj unction
- ii. Conjunction Averted
- III: Foundations for a German Policy, 1920–1922
- i. Two Proposals for Securing an Agreed Anglo-French German Policy
- ii. Churchill and Lloyd George dispute the Merits of a Coercive Approach
- iii. The Perils of Pragmatism
- iv. The Ascendancy of British Interests
- Conclusion