The Philosophy of John Dewey A Critical Exposition of His Method, Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge

John Dewey ranks as the most influential of America's philosophers. That in­ fluence stems, in part, from the originality of his mind, the breadth of his in­ terests, and his capacity to synthesize materials from diverse sources. In addi­ tion, Dewey was blessed with a long life and the extraor...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Dewey, R.E.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 1977, 1977
Edition:1st ed. 1977
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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505 0 |a I. Philosopher of Method -- 1. Dewey’s view of philosophy -- 2. Dewey’s instrumentalist theory of knowledge -- 3. Dewey’s emphasis on method in ethics, social philosophy, education, religion, and logic -- Conclusion -- II. Method and the Instrumentalist View of Man -- 1. Dewey’s description of the empirical method -- 2. Dewey’s philosophical starting point: man’s primary experience as a unity of activity, undifferentiated by thought-distinctions -- 3. Dewey’s instrumentalist view of man and its relationship to his recommendation of the empirical method -- Conclusion -- III. Scientific Foundations of the Instrumentalist View of Man -- 1. Biology -- 2. Psychology -- 3. Social theories -- Conclusion -- IV. The Instrumentalist View of the World -- 1. Dewey’s view of metaphysics -- 2. Dewey’s view of the world -- 3. Nature and empirical method -- V. Change -- 1. Structure and process -- 2. Dewey’s view as an alternative to the quest for substance and essence -- 3. The dual role of events -- VI. Contingency -- 1. Dewey’s reasons for believing that there is contingency in nature -- 2. Further clarification of Dewey’s case for contingency and assessment of its significance -- VII. Knowledge -- 1. Dewey’s attack on the spectator view of knowledge -- 2. Dewey’s view of knowledge: its applications and limits -- VIII. Toward a Broader Empiricism -- 1. Review of themes and difficulties in Dewey’s philosophy -- 2. The quest for essence 
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520 |a John Dewey ranks as the most influential of America's philosophers. That in­ fluence stems, in part, from the originality of his mind, the breadth of his in­ terests, and his capacity to synthesize materials from diverse sources. In addi­ tion, Dewey was blessed with a long life and the extraordinary energy to express his views in more than 50 books, approximately 750 articles, and at least 200 contributions to encyclopedias. He has made enduring intellectual contributions in all of the traditional fields of philosophy, ranging from studies primarily of interest for philosophers in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics to books and articles of wider appeal in ethics, political philosophy, religion, aesthetics, and education. Given the extent of Dewey's own writings and the many books and articles on his views by critics and defenders, it may be asked why there is a need for any further examination of his philosophy. The need arises because the lapse of time since his death in 1952 now permits a new generation of scholars to approach his work in a different spirit. Dewey is no longer a living partisan of causes, sparking controversy over the issues of the day. He is no longer the advocate of a new point of view which calls into question the basic assump­ tions of rival philosophical schools and receives an almost predictable criticism from their entrenched positions. His works have now become classics