What is Said A Theory of Indirect Speech Reports
The notion of what someone says is, perhaps surprisingly, some what less clear than we might be entitled to expect. Suppose that I utter to my class the sentence 'I want you to write a paper reconciling the things Russell claims about propositions in The Philosophy of Mathematics for next week...
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| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
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Dordrecht
Springer Netherlands
1990, 1990
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| Edition: | 1st ed. 1990 |
| Series: | Philosophical Studies Series
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | |
| Collection: | Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa |
Table of Contents:
- 1: Approaches to Natural Language
- 1. Sentences and Saying
- 2. Saying and Semantics
- 3. Saving Sentences, and What Is Said
- 4. Sentences and Propositions
- 2: Indexicality
- 1. Indexical Expressions
- 2. Some Examples
- 3. Too Many Indexicals?
- 4. The Eliminability of Indexicals
- 5. Russell’s Theory of Descriptions
- 3: Alternate Approaches
- 1. The Role of Context
- 2. Donnellan, Sentence Meaning and Speaker Meaning
- 3. The Demonstrative ’The’
- 4: Prolegomenon to a Theory of Speaker Reference
- 1. Two Approaches to Reference
- 2. Desiderata For A Theory of Speaker References
- 3. The Causal Theory
- 4. A Further Constraint
- 5: Speaker Reference
- 1. Two Unsatisfactory Intention-Based Views
- 2. A Fresh Start
- 3. Objections to the Sufficiency of the Conditions
- 4. Objections to the Necessity of the Conditions
- 5. Utterances Involving More Than One Hearer, and in the Absence of An Audience
- 6: Predication, and What is Said
- 1. Speaker Predication
- 2. A Theory of Speaker Predication
- 3. What Is Said
- 4. An Objection
- 5. Brevity and Sentence Fragments
- 6. Unusual But Important Cases
- 7: Concerning Fiction and Fictions
- 1. What Is To Be Explained
- 2. How Not To Explain It
- 3. A Better Explanation
- 4. Some Complications Concerning Fictions
- 8: Further Implications
- 1. Epistemology and the Philosophy of Language
- 2. Methodological Solipsism
- 3. The Intentional Fallacy, and Deconstruction
- 4. What If This Is All Wrong?
- Index of Names
- Index of Subjects