Principia Economica

It has already been said, if not written, that progress in knowledge in any domain consists mainly of expressing things that are well known in a different and, if possible, new way. That is the purpose of this book. In his solitary effort an author is entirely and solely responsible for what he writ...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bernard, G.
Format: eBook
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 1989, 1989
Edition:1st ed. 1989
Series:Theory and Decision Library A:, Rational Choice in Practical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science
Subjects:
Online Access:
Collection: Springer Book Archives -2004 - Collection details see MPG.ReNa
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505 0 |a 1. Agents -- 2. Resources -- 3. Fields of Forces -- 4. Relations between Agents. Activity -- 5. Degrees of Freedom for Agents. Alienation and Free Will -- 6. Choice Criteria. Utility. Resource Allocation -- Section 1. General -- Section 2. Agents’ Choices -- 7. Dimensional Approach -- 8. Money and Prices -- Section 1. Nature and Functions of Money -- Section 2. Money and Choices of Agents -- Section 3. Theory of Prices and of Equilibria -- Section 4. Money, Credit and Inflation -- Conclusions -- 9. Elementary Exchange -- 10. Transfers -- Section 1. General Theory of Transfers -- Section 2. Different Kinds of PITs and PNITs -- 11. Production and Value Added -- 12. Space and Time in Human Activity -- Section 1. Space -- Section 2. Time -- 13. Relations between Agents -- Section 1. The VA Distribution -- Section 2. The Public Agents -- Section 3. Private Individual Consumer Agents -- Section 4. Saving and Investment in Microeconomics -- Section 5. Financial and Monetary Economy -- Section 6. Other Types of Relations between Agents -- 14. Economic Processes -- Section 1. Definitions and Notations of the Model -- Section 2. Presentation of the Model -- Section 3. Aggregation -- Section 4. Dynamic Interpretation and Discussion of the Model -- Summary and Conclusions 
653 |a Economics 
653 |a Business 
653 |a Management science 
653 |a Business and Management 
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520 |a It has already been said, if not written, that progress in knowledge in any domain consists mainly of expressing things that are well known in a different and, if possible, new way. That is the purpose of this book. In his solitary effort an author is entirely and solely responsible for what he writes, including any mistakes or errors in the text. This is the case here as this book is not a result of a pluridisciplinary effort. It seems to the author that while reflection can be and sometimes is fruitful in a team, the task of bringing to light new ideas or to shed new light on old ones is mostly a solitary exercise. There are many illustrious examples to which, of course, the author does not compare himself: Quesnay, Rousseau, A. Smith, D. Ricardo, Fourier, Walras, Keynes, Freud and many others. The text contains many analogies between economics and phys­ ics. This last 'exact' science has adopted two paradigms in this century: disequilibria are essential and normal states; the dynamics of events, the temporal evolution of states, is the explanation of Nature. One could also add a third, the fundamental principles of uncertainty and randomness. The deterministic models that were current at the end of the last century were, on the contrary, attached to states of equilibrium and were invariant with respect to time as they assumed perfect causa­ lity, i.e. a perfect knowledge of the future